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Cross-Channel Welfare Chauvinism:
Backlash from Above and Below
Ressentiment racial et État providence en Grande-Bretagne et en France : au-
delà des approches top-down et bottom-up 
Olivier Esteves
1 It is generally estimated that the phrase “welfare chauvinism” was coined in a 1990
sociology article on the radical right in Norway and Denmark, i.e. when was ushered in
an age of neo-liberal welfare State rollback combined with increasing immigration and
ethnic diversity.1 In this paper, I want to interrogate this concept in both France and
England, both before and since the phrase emerged. As a major predictor of radical-
right voting, welfare chauvinism has been at the heart of the FN / RN emergence and
so-called dédiabolisation in France,2 as well as central to the Brexit vote in England.3 The
reference to “above” and “below” in the title suggests that to unpack the dynamics of
welfare chauvinism in both countries, I will draw from top-down populist discourses as
well  as  from  welfare  chauvinist  interpellations  of  the  ruling  elites  by  self-defined
“whites”,  “citizens”,  “Britons”  or  “French”,  “deserving  taxpayers”  who  “have  had
enough”. The present paper cannot possibly claim to be exhaustive on that complex,
multifaceted  question,  tackling  as  it  does  two  countries  over  a  half-century.  Its
somewhat tentative nature is therefore an invitation to further, more comprehensive
research  on  an  issue  of  ever-increasing  import  in  liberal  democracies.  Ideally,  this
research should mobilise comparable sources for each country, a very arduous task in
itself. Ideally too, quantitative and qualitative data ought to be combined, each taken
discretely being insufficient in themselves.
 
Cross-Channel Welfare Chauvinism: Backlash from Above and Below
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-4 | 2020
1
Top-down instrumentalisation of ethnocentric masses
and / or bottom-up interpellations of out-of-touch
elites ?
2 Polemics around the “racism” of the white working-classes are nowhere near ending.
On  both  sides  of  the  channel,  media  and  political  discourses  on  autochthonous
working-classes as vociferously disapproving of ethnic diversity and being resentful of
immigrants  and  ethnic  minorities  that  jump  the  queue  of  welfare  provision  have
become somewhat routine, particularly at election times. Sometimes, these take the
form of miserabilist discourses that whet inter-community feuds all the better to divide
and  conquer  vulnerable  classes  that,  in  actual  fact,  happen  to  share  so  much.4
Sometimes, the working-classes are pathologized into the “left-behind” or “left out”,
resentful classes, whose espousal of backlash politics coheres with classical views of
racism as stemming from individual, troubled minds.5 Sometimes too, such views are in
sync with classical  interpretations of  ethnocentric masses that are informed by the
“authoritarian  personality”  of  Adorno  et  al6,  although,  it  has  to  be  said,  these
interpretations are now largely dismissed in academia.7
3 In Britain, some commentators (Linsey Hanley, Reni Eddo-Lodge)8 have been critical of
the manufacturing of populist backlash by dint of references to the white working-class,
as though non-whites, whether born in London or Lagos, were ontologically removed
from the bounds of tax-paying, deserving, hard-working ordinariness.9 These points
have been made quite convincingly in academia too, be it by historians (Jon Lawrence)10
or  sociologists  (David  Gillborn).11 In  France,  analogous  critiques  have  been  voiced,
particularly by activists and scholars on the “Roma question” (Eric Fassin),12 on elite-
constructed discourses on Muslim Otherness (Marwan Mohammed, Abdellali Hajjat)13
as well as on the mainstreaming of far-right perception frames by reactionary forces.14
Likewise,  some  colleagues  have  been  critical  of  the  frequent  invocation  of  “Front
National, premier parti ouvrier” which tends to downplay the importance of abstention in
elections as well as to validate the pathologisation of the working-classes as inherently
driven by irrational, “racist” passions. Some of these writings also shed crucial, critical
light  on  the  far-right’s  “populism”  in  France  (Annie  Collovald,  Violaine  Girard).15
Empirically, Stéphane Beaud and Michel Pialoux have also argued that « l’analyse en soi
d’un ‘racisme ouvrier’ n’a pas grand sens parce qu’elle procède, fondamentalement, par
abstraction des conditions sociales d’existence du groupe ouvrier ».16
4 In broad terms, a large portion of the qualitative studies17 of far-right populism are
either externalist approaches, which lay stress on propaganda, brochures, and more
generally speaking on the economic, social, attitudinal, or cultural environments of the
radical-right. Internalist approaches are fewer in number, for “data from interviews
with members, observations of group activities, and internal documents are difficult to
obtain”.18 They  are  generally  ethnographies  of  the  far-right  (Hilary  Pilkington  in
England, Daniel Bizeul in France) or of white backlash responses to ethnic diversity
(Roger Hewitt or Justin Gest in London, Michelle Lamont in the Paris outskirts) which
apprehend  populism  in  terms  of  grassroots  interpellations  of  the  elites.  In  fact,
sociologist  Paul  Mepschen,  who  carried  out  ethnographic  research  into  backlash
responses in a working-class area of Amsterdam, suggests a broadening of the category
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of  “populism”,  in  order  to  embrace  bottom-up  “processes  of  articulation,
interpellation, and […] agency”.19 This is what this paper tries to do, if in a limited way. 
5 The  fact  is  that  top-down  and  bottom-up  perspectives  ought  to  be  considered  in
constant, complex interaction rather than in strictly exclusive terms. In France, Sylvain
Laurens’s work on haut fonctionnaires archives has convincingly demonstrated that elite
anxieties over grassroots feelings actually led directly to the closing of national borders
in 1974,20 thereby anticipating -but also cultivating- the nativist backlash that was to
set  in  by  the  next  decade,  particularly  with  the  consecutive  Front  National
breakthroughs at the elections of 1984, 1985, 1986. In Britain, the Labourite slogan on
immigration  “without  integration,  limitation  is  inexcusable;  without  limitation,
integration is  impossible”21 was both an elite,  paternalistic exhortation in favour of
“racial harmony” at grassroots level as much as an elite pandering to local anxieties
over  immigration  in  the  wake  of  the  nativist  backlash  during  the  1964  general
elections. 
6 The archival material which partly sustains this paper, i.e. letters of support to Enoch
Powell, also provides a powerful challenge to the top-down vs bottom-up binary. This is
because, after his Walsall speech of February 9th 1968, the Midland Tory was astonished
to  have  received  some  800  letters  of  support,  from  which  he  drew  the  rhetorical,
backlash fodder for his next speech, the Birmingham speech, routinely labelled ‘Rivers
of Blood’.22 In the following fortnight, he received some 100 000 letters, overwhelmingly
in support. 
7 Powell’s speech was therefore a public performance (in Goffman’s sense)23 of radical
right populism echoing, and in so doing framing, exacerbating, indeed uninhibiting,
some  grassroots  perceptions,  feelings,  injustice  frames.  These  had  been  simmering
since  the  1960-1962  large-scale  non-white  immigrant  influx,  and  the  1964  general
elections,  particularly  at  Smethwick,  sometimes  dubbed  “Britain’s  most  racist
election”.24 Instead of merely identifying Powell as a populist and focusing exclusively
on his rhetoric, his political style, his ideology and his strategic marginality within the
conservative party,  it  is  preferable to apprehend his  campaign against  immigration
from the point of view of a -discursively efficient- asymmetrical ritual of interaction,
wherein disgruntled constituents confide to their political hero their backlash personal
narratives, which he would rhetorically exploit in his next speeches. 
8 It is also noteworthy for the purpose of this contribution that nowhere in his 1968 did
Powell  overtly  refer  to  non-white  immigrants  as  undeservedly  getting  welfare
assistance  of  any  sort.  And  yet,  the  backlash  correspondence  he  received  was
overwhelmingly in the form of welfare chauvinism. This is copious evidence, as has
been suggested by Camilla Schofield, of the ways in which the Wolverhampton M.P.
conferred  political  respectability  to  feelings  and  perceptions  hitherto  deemed
impossible to verbalise. To be sure, the private mode of communication -letter-writing-
made it  easier  to  communicate certain prejudices,  especially  to  a  person deemed a
political  friend,  or  hero.  The  many  thousands  of  welfare  chauvinist  responses  he
received and the fact that he never explicitly expressed those views is interesting in
itself, and suggests that these perception frames had been embedded in British public
opinion  before  1968,  but  had  remained  somewhat  politically  dormant.  Elizabeth
Buettner has unveiled some of these perceptions by focusing on Smethwick in 1964,
notably  by  mobilizing  letters  to  the  editor  in  the  local  press,  particularly  to  a
newspaper, The Smethwick Telephone and Warley Courier, that was quite ready to vocalize
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the  local  backlash  responses.25 If  anything,  the  disconnect  between  top-down
discourses  (explicitly)  devoid  of  welfare  chauvinist  references  and  bottom-up
outpourings  replete  with  welfare  chauvinism  tends  in  itself  to  nuance,  if  not  to
challenge, the binary analysed here.
 
Forms and degrees of welfare chauvinism
9 “Welfare chauvinism”, according to Herbert Kitschelt, is an attitude among those who
support “a system of social protection [only] for those who belong to the ethnically
defined community and who have contributed to it”.26 Welfare chauvinist perceptions
are overwhelmingly conditioned by perceptions of deservingness, whose contours are
delineated by three elements :  identity  (the extent  to  which recipients  belong to a
common  identity)  ;  attitude  (the  extent  to  which  they  are  grateful  for  the  help)  ;
reciprocity (the extent to which recipients are ready to help when it is their turn to do
so).27
10 Although it  has been challenged by some scholars,28 there is  a  widely-shared,  quite
uncontroversial  sense that  public  trust  in Welfare redistribution tends to rest  on a
broad assumption of likeness : the stronger the sense of imagined community within a
nation, the more likely taxpayers will be to acquiesce to tax schemes funding schools,
hospitals,  unemployment  benefits,  etc.  Etienne  Balibar  has  used  the  phrase
“preferential altruism”,29 which is quite apposite here. After all, the great state-builders
at the root of welfare provision (T. H. Marshall, William Beveridge, Gunnar Myrdal in
Sweden)  hardly  believed  otherwise.30 For  one,  T.  H.  Marshall  argued  in  1950  that
consent to welfare help was predicated on a “direct sense of community membership
based on a loyalty to a civilization that is a common possession”.31At the international
level, the language in use reflected such boundaries : Frederick Cooper, for one, has
written on the important connections between “development” as a goal of the British
Colonial Office and “welfare” -so key to British politics by 1940, thereby confirming
demarcation lines between the metropole and the Empire / Commonwealth.32
11 As  may  be  expected,  racialisation  discourses  in  all  their  forms  tend  to  exacerbate
welfare  chauvinism.  “Racialisation”  is  here  loosely  understood  in  the  sense  of
underlining the Otherness of social groups who in many cases share the citizenship of
the majority group. This may consist in labelling as “immigrants” communities that are
not  “immigrants”,  or  in  referring  to  groups  as  “second  generation  immigrants”,
“Maghrébins”, etc. It may also consist in foregrounding the cultural incompatibility of
certain communities. For instance, when on June 19th 1991, at a « dîner-débat» of his
Gaullist political party (the now defunct RPR) in Orléans, Jacques Chirac exposed « le
bruit et l’odeur » (‘the noise and the smell’) of certain large families in the Goutte d’Or
neighbourhood of Paris (well-known for being a multicultural and disadvantaged area),
r,  he was not  delivering a  welfare chauvinist  speech as  such,  but  his  invocation of
autochthonous  deservingness  and  respectability  faced  with  the  cultural,  radical
Otherness  of  supposedly  thankless  immigrants  was  certainly  conducive  to
legitimizations of welfare chauvinist invectives. More subtly these recent years, the FN
/ RN’s harnessing of « laïcité » and the suggestion that Muslims are demanding special
rights (instead of just being in line with freedom of religion as guaranteed in the 1905
separation of Church and State)33 certainly legitimizes welfare chauvinist narratives as
well. This, albeit in an oblique way, echoes what Kymlicka and Banting have called the
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politics of recognition / politics of redistribution trade-off. The politics of recognition
in the form of multiculturalism, with differential treatment of specific groups within
society, seem to clash the universalistic dimension of Welfare distribution.
12 My research on the Powell letters has unveiled three categories of welfare chauvinism
which appear as master frames overlapping to some degree. The first two are projected
as “common sense” viewpoints which often make it possible to stave off accusations of
“racialism”.34 The third is explicitly offensive. 
13 First,  demographic  welfare  chauvinism.  This  is  about  strains  on  social  services
generated by the large number of immigrants,  particularly in the field of education
(primary schools) and of health (maternity wards). It is partly predicated on a silencing
of old-age pensions, since immigrants are young and old-age social  schemes do not
concern  them  at  all.  Although  some  immigrants  (Pakistanis)  were  notorious  tax-
shirkers, claiming allowance for non-existent children back in Pakistan,35 it is a fact
that with benefits and costs taken together immigrants brought -and still bring today-
more to the State finances36 as well as to the economy than they took. 
14 Sometimes, these welfare chauvinist responses informed local policies. Worried about
the immigrant strain on the local housing market, the communist mayor of Vénissieux
(housing estate to the east of Lyon) initiated, in the early 1980s, a policy of seuil  de
tolérance in practice by deliberately keeping vacant flats in his town rather than make
them  available  for  immigrant  families,  all  in  an  effort  to  keep  the  autochthonous
established working-classes and the middle-classes in the area.37 
15 Second, “Length of residence welfare chauvinism”. This is a rarer type of narrative,
which lays stress on immigrants as newcomers, and never refers to them as British
citizens or taxpayers.  Length of  residence is  seen as  conferring legitimacy to claim
welfare provision, through what may be called a kind of autochthonous capital. In such
discourses tax is central.
16 Thirdly,  “stigmatizing  welfare  chauvinism”.  In  this  very  recurrent  narrative,
immigrants  are  vilified  as  “scroungers”,  “parasites”,  whose  presence  in  Britain  is
mostly  (or  solely)  owed  to  welfare  generosity.  Below  are  a  few  examples  of  such
invectives from Powell’s postbag in 1968 : 
“Let’s face it, the immigrants do not come out of any love for Britain, but for our
Welfare State, which has been the ruination of our country” (Man, Chesshire).
“With these benefits gone the inflow of coloured people would cease. They only
come to get something for nowt” (constituent from Hatch End, Middlesex).
“The  time  for  GIVING  has  to  stop,  now  they  should  start  to  contribute  to  the
country they hate so much they can’t bear to leave” (woman, Reading).
“The only magnet drawing immigrants here is the extraordinary insane generosity
of the greatest international charity ever :  the Welfare State” (constituent from
Manchester).
“Immigrants  [...]  can  safely  be  expected  to  become  parasites  and  unproductive
members of our society” (Constituent from Bushey Heath (Hertfordshire)).
“The welfare state is the new Eldorado for these people, who can live comfortably
without working, on the ‘hand-outs’ of the welfare state” (man, Stoke-on-Trent).38
17 The White politics of belonging39 were sometimes consolidated in more inventive ways.
Such  was  the  case  with  those  factory  poems  ostracizing immigrants  as  “welfare
parasites”. Tellingly, some of these echo each other, in a national string of popular
verse fuelled by a complex skein of gossip and rumours.40 Although the writing skills
displayed  therein  fuel  a  very  local  type  of  pride,  like  some  football  chants  from
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Bournemouth to Aberdeen, they are in fact remarkably alike across the country. Whole
stanzas are identical, using deprecatory, homo-social humour as a discursive shield to
make sense of a perceived threat, replete with references to the “dole”, which is itself
constantly racialised. What follows was sent by nine factory workers in Lancashire and
is entitled “England my England”, but almost the same poem was sent from Glasgow as
well as from some unidentified place in England : 
I come to England, poor and broke, go on dole, see labour bloke / Six months on
dole, got plenty money, good fresh meat to fill  my tummy / Send for friends in
Pakistan, tell them come quick as can / Plenty of us on the dole, lovely suit and big
bank roll/ National assistance is a boon, all dark men on it soon.41
18 In an immensely popular TV show which purported to expose racist stereotypes, the
main character,  cockney bigot  Alf  Garnett,  regularly  inveighed against  immigrants,
whom  he  inevitably  dismissed  as  “welfare  scroungers”.42 If  anything,  this  speaks
volumes about the extent to which these offensive badges were deeply rooted some
fifty years before Brexit. This was a post-colonial hangover to some extent, stemming
from fancied visions of “African sloth”,43 indigenous peoples whose tropical climates
made them inherently reluctant to work, etc. The climate element was also sometimes
invoked as immigration’s raison d’être : the idea that the weather was so inclement in
Manchester  or  Newcastle  that  non-whites  from  Bombay  or  Kingston  could  only be
attracted by welfare bonanzas, an idea expressed frequently in Powell’s postbag.
19 Such archival sources are not to be found in France, and if they do exist, to a much
more  limited  degree,  they  are  very  hard  to  come  by.  The  Front  National  /
Rassemblement  National  is  notoriously  secretive  about  their  archives,  although the
party  is  known  to  treat  scholars  quite  differently  from  the  way  they  deal  with
journalists.44 Letters to the editor sent to Minute (created in 1962) and Rivarol (founded
in 1951) might provide some information about far-right grassroots backlash against
those perceived as “undeserving” immigrants, but the nature of the sources is (very)
different from Powell’s postbag,45 and the readership of both publications is much more
limited than the cross-class, cross-party, indeed kaleidoscopic backlash that informs
the 1968-9 epistolary support to the Wolverhampton demagogue. One other solution
would be to unveil constituent letters to municipalities in well-known areas of ethnic
minority and immigrant clustering, in Seine Saint Denis, or around Lyon and to the
north of Marseille. Much of this research remains to be done. 
 
The rootedness of English welfare chauvinism, an
exception in Europe ?
20 In the 21st century, there is quantitative evidence suggesting that, in the UK, welfare
chauvinism itself is somewhat stronger than in France. Yet, in itself it remains quite
unexceptional by European standards, if quite high when compared with other Western
or  Northern  European  nations.  The  European  Social  Survey  analysed  by  Stevan
Svallfors, based on 34 947 interviews across some 28 EU / non EU European countries,
unpacks the intensity of welfare chauvinism with the question ““when should non-
nationals start being allowed to get welfare provision ?”. The most liberal option is
“immediately on arrival”.  There are then various categories  down to the very end,
“they should never get welfare provision”, which is itself the strongest indicator of a
welfare chauvinist  attitude.  A selection of  some 10 countries  from the 28 has been
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reproduced in Table 1, which highlights but also nuances the UK’s exceptionalism as
far as welfare chauvinism is concerned. The UK displays levels which are reasonably
higher than France’s, and much higher than Sweden’s. Nevertheless, the UK figures are
slightly  below Russia’s  and much below Turkey’s,  in  a  study carried  out  before the
European migrant crisis, whose effects were felt much more keenly in Turkey than they
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2.4 5.5 35.1 42.1 14.9
France 12.2 10.7 47.0 25.1 5.0
Germany 8.4 11.8 43.4 29.9 6.5
Netherlands 7.8 9.7 35.2 44.5 2.8
Russian Fed. 4.8 5.0 31.7 46.2 12.3
Spain 11.4 9.2 52.1 21.7 5.6
Sweden 19.8 16.2 31.1 32.1 0.7
Switzerland 12.5 12.9 56.1 15.7 2.9
United
Kingdom
5.6 5.4 48.6 31.5 8.9
Turkey 10.0 10.2 18.9 41.9 19.0
21 Table 1 Source : European Social Survey, 2008-9, 34 947 respondents in 28 E.U. and non
E.U.  European countries,  printed in Stevan SVALLFORS (ed.),  Contested Welfare  States,
Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond, Stanford (Cal.) : Stanford University Press, 2012, p.
137-8. 
22 The  relative  strength  of  welfare  chauvinism  in  the  U.K.  might  stem  from  several
structural causes : a Welfare State which is more weakened than in other countries due
to  decades  of  roll-back,  a  super-diversity  which  is  higher  than  in  other  European
countries, and the particularly visible influence of the conservative, backlash media.46
At  this  stage,  however,  further  research  would  be  necessary  to  fully  evaluate  the
relevance of these potential explanatory factors. 
23 More  broadly  speaking,  some  reservations  may  be  expressed  about  this  type  of  ?
European  survey.  First,  and  following  Bourdieu’s  1972  lecture  «L’opinion  publique
n’existe  pas  »  (‘public  opinion  does  not  exist’),  opinion  polls  generate  the  illusory
impression that all people ask themselves the same questions in the same terms at the
same time by asking the same questions to every respondent, thereby creating what
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Bourdieu  calls  a  “consensus  effect”  (effet  de  consensus).47 Then,  opinion  polls
perniciously  invite  respondents  to  answer  questions  they  did  not  necessarily  ask
themselves  in  the  first  place.  Worryingly  in  the  present  case,  asking  that  specific
question  seems  to  validate  the  fact  that  immigrants  themselves  are,  as  it  were,
inherently motivated by getting welfare help, and not just by working, finding a place
to live where they are safe from harm, etc. On top of this, asking the same question to
Swedish people as well as to Russian and Turkish people also seems to validate the fact
that Welfare State provision is comparable across European nations, which it so very
obviously is not.
24 Be that as it may, the European Social Survey does suggest that Welfare Chauvinism is
stronger in Britain than in France, and the reasons for this have inevitably to do with
the fact that welfare chauvinist attitudes of the type analysed in postbag Powellism is
(much)  more  deeply  entrenched historically,  and this  beyond the  structural  causes
ventured above.  In the mid-1960s,  as  we have briefly  seen,  such perception frames
explaining the non-white immigrant presence were almost routine among ethnocentric
Britons, both within urban sites of ethnic clustering as well as in areas with no known
history of immigration at all, for instance in the southern villages of Devon, Cornwall,
Dorset.48 
25 As opposed to this, only by the early 1980s would welfare chauvinist responses really
start to crystallize in France. Certain lengthy ethnographies of working-class life do not
at all refer to the immigrant presence as a threat on the job market, or as a strain on
welfare  services,  although  the  dole  queues  were  inexorably  lengthening  through
systemic  deindustrialization.  In  this  respect,  Olivier  Schwarz’s  Le  Monde  privé  des
ouvriers based  on  a  five-year  immersion  in  the  bassin  minier  (translate  into  English)
around Hénin-Beaumont and Lens is a very apposite example.49 Within the work on
Front National edited by Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau, a mid-1980s ethnographic
fieldwork on 132 Front National voters in the Paris and Bordeaux banlieues pays very
little attention to welfare chauvinism, with only one 50-year old man from Les Ulis
(Essonne) arguing that he is sick and tired of contributing, via his council tax (impôts
locaux) to the financing of the local mosque as well as to Portuguese language classes so
that children of immigrants may go back home.50 Most of the other nativist backlash is
expressed  in  terms  of  “numerological  racism”,51 of  the  type  “there  are  too  many
immigrants and we don’t feel at home any longer”, or the “cultural inherentism” type,
52 expressed in terms of “their culture is too different and they can’t be assimilated”. It
may  therefore  be  conducive  to  welfare  chauvinism  without  being  overtly  welfare
chauvinist per se. Front National rhetoric and propaganda, particularly as it appeared
on posters, presented itself in terms of nativist, economic common-sense on the job
market, such as with the very well-known : « Un million de chômeurs c’est un million
d’immigrés de trop » (one million jobless is one million immigrants too many) in the 1980s
which had become, one decade later, the same sound-bite but with “three millions”
instead.53 Officially,  instead  of  presenting  so-called  “immigrants”  as  sponging  off
welfare bonanzas, these were presented as a threat on the job market, and a cultural,
civilizational threat with an increasing focus on the radical Otherness of Islam. 
26 In  bottom-up  terms,  the  “parasitic  argument”  against  immigrants  and  ethnic
minorities as “scroungers” started to be more openly and systematically expressed by
the  1990s,  as  was  evidenced  in  Michelle  Lamont’s  early  1990s  ethnography  at  the
periphery of Paris. One Ivry man vituperated : “Parasites….I hate all of them. All those
Cross-Channel Welfare Chauvinism: Backlash from Above and Below
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-4 | 2020
8
people that don’t have a sense of responsibility […] I am very familiar with them. They
don’t  work.  They  only  know  the  way  to  the  unemployment  insurance  office,  the
ASSEDIC  [the  acronym  for  this  office,  which  he  pronounces  with  a  North  African
accent]”.54 Very  often  though,  welfare  chauvinist  responses  were  couched  in  more
inarticulate,  cautious  terms,  highlighting  the  priority  to  foster  solidarity  among
nationals  rather  than  with  non-nationals,  as  is  evidenced  here  with  Emmanuelle
Comtat’s ethnographic fieldwork among pieds-noirs :  « Quand on dit les lois sociales
pour les Français, je dis d’accord. Quand on dit, les immigrés, bon, s’ils veulent venir
pour travailler, autrement qu’ils restent chez eux ».55 
27 To a  large  extent,  the  Front  National  programmatic  sea-change  in  the  course  of  a
generation epitomizes the new centrality of  welfare chauvinism. Indeed, one of the
main shifts between Jean-Marie Le Pen (until 2000) and Marine Le Pen (since 2000) has
been what Cécile Alduy has rightly labeled le virage étatique.56 Whereas Jean-Marie Le
Pen was an unreserved supporter of Reaganite Welfare roll-back in the 1980s, Marine
Le Pen has time and again foregrounded the pivotal function of the State, be it in terms
of law and order but also in terms of social services. Indeed, les services publics is the
third noun clause that is most often used in her speeches as analysed by Alduy and
Wahnich.57 The State in her rhetoric  is  deemed a national  bulwark against  the evil
forces  of  corporate  and  cosmopolitan  «  mondialisme  »,  whatever  this  word  might
mean. And this State could primarily cater to the dire needs of nationals. Marine Le
Pen, by invoking Jean Jaurès, places the protective, welfare State at the heart of her
agenda in the same way as radical right forces in Britain (the BNP) have presented
themselves using the slogan “We’re the Labour Party your grandparents voted for”
(BNP), or projecting themselves as political forces whose priority was to save the NHS
(as UKIP during the Brexit referendum campaign of 2016). Most of these campaigns are
either  conducive  to  welfare  chauvinist  responses, or  else  directly  utilize  welfare
chauvinism to garner greater electoral support.58 Again, as with Powell’s speeches and
his  postbag  discussed  above,  the  overlap  between  discourses  that  are  explicitly  or
implicitly  welfare  chauvinist,  or  else  nurturing such perception frames,  all  tend to
challenge neatly-drawn bottom-up or top-down dichotomies.
 
Conclusion 
28 In  White  Identities,  A  Critical  Sociological  Approach,  Steve  Garner  and  Simon  Clarke
articulate the view that whereas in decades past there was a widespread feeling among
whites  that  “those  people”  were  coming to  “steal  our  jobs”,  the  general  feelings
post-2000 is rather that the very same people are perceived as communities who come
“to sponge our welfare”.59 Similar points have been made on the far-right’s electoral
appeal, particularly in political science works on the B.N.P.60 I want to argue here that
such perceptions were already extremely widespread in 1968, and probably a few years
before.  Indeed,  the  violently  welfare  chauvinist,  “parasitic argument”  legitimizing
racial  animus was so much more widespread than the “they steal  our job” type of 
argument, itself quite rare, or often nuanced.
29 To be sure, this is an exception not only when the rootedness of such perception frames
are compared with France, but probably also with the rest of Europe, at least the part of
Europe that has a more or less recent history of immigration (say from France to Italy,
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from Belgium to Spain) as well as Welfare redistribution schemes that are part of the
warp-and-woof of street-level and national level bureaucracy.
30 In both countries as elsewhere, welfare chauvinist otherings of immigrants and ethnic
minorities,  which  by  contrast  reinforce  self-perceptions  and  self-projections  of
deservingness and of nationals as “disciplined selves”, to borrow Lamont’s phrase, very
often  are  rooted  in  a  proclaimed  personal  experience  that  contrasts  with  elite
invocations of racial harmony, multicultural integration, etc. As Blondel and Lacroix
put  it  in  their  1980s  fieldwork  on  Paris  and  Bordeaux  :  « L’invocation/  évocation
renvoie  ainsi  à  l’expérience  immédiate:  on  n’aura  pas  été  sans  remarquer  que  les
propos cités s’appuient sur le lieu d’habitation et qu'ils convoquent, à ce titre, tout un
ensemble  d'expériences  non  nécessairement  construites  intellectuellement  qui  ont
trait à l’espace social des relations quotidiennes ».61 Similar points have been made by
Noiriel in more broadly historical terms.62 Strange though it might seem, one of the
ways in which ethnic minorities and immigrants might manage to counter deep-rooted
narratives of welfare chauvinism is by elbowing their way into an ordinariness that is
all  too often apprehended as “white”.  In this  sense,  the recent COVID-19 pandemic
provides a glimmer of an answer. The video “You Clap for Me Now”63 went viral on
British social networks, unveiling the simple fact that many Britons’ lives are indeed
daily serviced by socially invisible armies of BAME workers, this nearly four years after
Brexit.  Only  the  future  will  tell  whether  the  many  outpourings  of  cross-ethnic
solidarity, the quotidian, friendly interaction with ethnic minority and immigrant staff
in hospitals and services in general (garbage collection, etc.) can possibly be combined
with radical right support, made all the more acceptable as “welfare chauvinist” frames
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ABSTRACTS
This article provides a comparison of welfare chauvinism responses in France and England, and
demonstrates that there is in the latter a much deeper rootedness of such nativist dynamics, not
only vis-à-vis France, but also when compared with other European countries. The article also
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interrogates  top-down and bottom-up approaches in  the social  sciences,  particularly  as  they
apply  to  welfare  chauvinism.  The  extreme  interconnectedness  between  the  two  is  not
acknowledged in classical studies of “populism”. Bringing together elite-driven discourses and
grassroots interpellations of said elites, combining qualitative and quantitative data, the article
underlines how deep-seated welfare chauvinist responses are in England, reaching back to at
least the mid-1960s, whereas similar responses or dynamics (« seuil de tolérance », etc.) would
appear  to  be  much  more  recent  in  France,  whose  major  radical-right,  nativist  party
(Rassemblement National) only fairly recently tapped into such feelings.
Cet  article  compare  l’enracinement  des  thématiques  de  welfare  chauvinism en  France  et  en
Angleterre,  concluant  à  une exception anglaise  en  la  matière,  non seulement  vis-à-vis  de  la
France,  mais sans doute dans un cadre européen plus global.  En outre,  l’article interroge les
catégories de top-down et bottom-up dans les sciences sociales, arguant pour une prise en compte
de  l’interaction  constante  entre  ces  deux  dynamiques,  ce  qu’une  appréciation  classique  du
“populisme” dans l’analyse du welfare chauvinism ne permet pas. Combinant des discours d’élite et
des  interpellations  de  la  base  (grassroots),  des  données  qualitatives  et  quantitatives,  l’article
insiste  sur  le  très  profond  enracinement  en  Angleterre  de  ces  perceptions,  schèmes
interprétatifs, etc., qui remontent au moins au milieu des années 1960, là où des thématiques
similaires  (« seuil  de  tolérance »,  etc.)  sont  plus  récentes  en  France,  et  ont  été  mobilisés
électoralement par la droite radicale plus récemment.
INDEX
Mots-clés: État-Providence, ethnicité, droites radicales, France, Grande-Bretagne.
Keywords: welfare state, welfare chauvinism, top-down / bottom-up approaches, race prejudice,
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